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Introduction 
Pakistan is a vital U.S. ally in the global war on terrorism. This is not the first time the United 
States has relied on Islamabad for its defense needs: Pakistan provided crucial support in the 
Cold War struggle against communism, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, and it re-
emerged as a “frontline state” in the covert campaign to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan in 
the 1980s. After each of these periods, however, U.S.-Pakistan partnership broke down under the 
weight of altered international conditions and irretrievable strategic divergences. Because of this 
troubled history, and also due to current uncertainties about Pakistan’s domestic stability and 
commitment to democracy, its close military ties to North Korea and China, its fractious relations 
with India and Afghanistan, and its checkered history of control over nuclear weapon technology, 
some observers warn that Pakistan is “at best a reluctant supporter of U.S. goals and at worst a 
potential long-term adversary.”[1] Even if one accepts the rationale for “a close and enduring” 
U.S.-Pakistan partnership “for the long term,”[ 2] there is every reason to scrutinize what kind of 
strategic ally Pakistan may become, especially after Washington's good friend, President Pervez 
Musharraf, departs the scene.  
It is a very challenging task to explain what motivates a country's foreign and defense policies 
and to predict how it will behave in the future, especially when the country in question is so 
distant—culturally as well as physically—from one's own nation. Fortunately, international 
relations theory has something to offer here. Several well developed arguments can be brought to 
bear on the analysis of a country's foreign policy. But unfortunately, there is no consensus on 
which of the many candidate approaches is most useful for explaining and predicting a given 
country's defense strategies. In particular, structural realism (or neo-realism) and strategic 
cultural analysis offer potentially important insights into Pakistan's past, present, and future 
security policies. Rather than attempting to describe Pakistan's strategic preferences and 
behavior through one approach, selected a priori, this essay identifies and tests each of these 
competing theories of foreign policy against Pakistan's actual behavior. The underlying objective 
is to determine the value of strategic cultural analysis relative to realism and other explanatory 
approaches.  
After describing the general contours of Pakistan's security policy, I infer predictions from two 
separate theoretical approaches and then evaluate these predictions against the historical data 
on two specific Pakistani policies: (1) Pakistan's decision to pursue nuclear weapons, and (2) its 
post 9-11 decision to reverse its support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and more generally 
support the United States in the global war on terrorism. These two policies are vitally important 
to Pakistan's national security today; thus this analysis is designed not only to test leading IR 
theories, but also to generate important insights about the key features of Pakistan's current and 
future strategic conduct.  
I argue that neither of the two theoretical approaches considered can adequately explain why 
Pakistan has pursued its main security policies. Neo-realism has the most explanatory power, but 
it cannot explain all of the phenomena that are of immediate interest to policymakers. However, a 
realist approach, supplemented with a kind of strategic cultural analysis can fill the most important 
gaps in our understanding of Pakistani security policy. The specific theoretical model that I find to 
have the most explanatory power is one that combines elements of realism with elements of 
culture, but also adds a third dimension: the critical role of individual elites who identify and 
respond to structural (realist) incentives in a manner consistent with culturally accepted modes of 
behavior, but who also redefine and transform the strategic culture in line with both their own 
strategic preferences and their understanding of the room they have to maneouvre within the 
constraints of the international security system. In other words, these elites, whom I call myth 
makers, operate within the constraints of both the international environment and their nation's 
political culture, but they are not helpless prisoners of these two confining structures; they have 
some degree of freedom to reorient and expand the internal and external boundaries of their 
behavior.[3] But, it should be noted, the more a myth maker tries to push out either of these 
boundaries of traditional behavior, the greater the risk he runs domestically and internationally.  
Although this combined explanatory approach sacrifices some elegance and parsimony, and thus 
may not be particularly attractive to some IR theorists, it serves the needs of policy analysts 
better than most candidate approaches. It enables observers to identify—and potentially 
influence—three sets of variables:  
1. the regional and international security context of the country in question,  
2. its strategic culture, and  
3. the perceptions and political actions of national myth makers.  
After developing the argument in general terms, I outline several policy implications for the United 
States related to Pakistan's future strategic conduct. 
Competing Theoretical Approaches 
Scant theoretical attention has been devoted to understanding Pakistan's foreign and defense 
policies, but two approaches in vogue in the international relations (IR) theory literature could be 
specified to illuminate certain of Pakistan's main strategic preferences and behavior. Because 
these two approaches—neo-realism and strategic cultural analysis—are likely to generate 
contradictory predictions about Pakistan's security policy, my goal is to test their utility in 
explaining key features of Pakistani policy.[4] Beyond that, I also show what we should take away 
for our ongoing project to improve the explanatory power and policy relevance of strategic cultural 
analysis. 
Neo-realism  
Realism is the most time-honored approach for understanding general patterns of state behavior 
in an anarchic international political system. The main expectations of neo-realism, the version of 
realism popularized by Kenneth Waltz, are (1) the recurrence of balances of power in the 
international political system; (2) the tendency of states to balance, or strengthen themselves in 
the face of external military threats; and (3) the inclination of states to imitate one another and to 
become socialized to the world political system.[5] Power balancing is the oldest concept in the 
literature on international relations; it is central to all brands of realism.[6] According to Stephen 
Walt and Kenneth Waltz, countries usually balance against serious foreign threats to their 
security; rarely do they bandwagon, that is, accommodate or appease the countries making these 
threats.[7] Countries can balance “internally”—by relying on their own military capabilities—or 
“externally”—by relying on the military capabilities of allies.[8] Statesmen generally prefer internal 
balancing because it leaves less to chance and less to the will of others.[9] 
Strategic Culture  
There is no consensus on the precise definition or characteristics of strategic culture, but most 
authors would agree, at least in general terms, with the definition offered nearly thirty years ago 
by Jack Snyder, who describes strategic culture as “the sum total of ideals, conditional emotional 
responses, and patterns of behavior that members of the national strategic community have 
acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other…”[10] Stephen Rosen’s 
approach is very similar, observing that strategic culture is made up of the shared “beliefs and 
assumptions that frame … choices about international military behavior, particularly those 
concerning decisions to go to war, preferences for offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of 
warfare, and levels of wartime casualties that would be acceptable.”[11] Ian Johnston provides 
one of the more recent and widely embraced approaches to the concept. In contrast to the 
material context of realism, Johnston portrays strategic culture as “an ideational milieu which 
limits behavior choices.” This milieu is shaped by “shared assumptions and decision rules that 
impose a degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, 
organizational or political environment.”[12] 
Nearly all adherents to strategic cultural analysis recognize that in order to understand a nation’s 
strategic culture, the observer needs to immerse him or herself in its history, attitudes, and 
conduct—in short, the observer needs to practice good area studies. The methodology employed 
typically is derived from cultural anthropology and political sociology. One does not have to go as 
far as Clifford Geertz, who argued that “As interworked systems of construable signs (symbols), 
culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can 
be causally attributed; it is a context, something within which they can be intelligibly—that is, 
thickly described.”[13] Thick description is necessary for strategic cultural analysis, but it is 
insufficient for the explanatory task we have at hand. 
A reasonable explanation—as opposed to a purely “thick” description—for a country’s key 
strategic policies is possible. It requires a more precise approach, one that singles out specific 
variables and examines their causal impact. In the next section, I provide a brief, “semi-thick” 
description of the cultural context of Pakistan’s security policy, and then identify five key 
characteristics of Pakistani strategic culture. This allows me to compare the explanatory value of 
strategic culture with neo-realism and with the myth-making model that I develop in the following 
section. 
Pakistan's Strategic Culture  
Pakistan is one of the least secure countries on the planet. As a reflection of its obsession with 
security, Pakistan now spends close to $4 billion per year on defense, which ranks 28th highest in 
the world. More tellingly, it ranks 19th in the world in terms of military expenditure as a percent of 
GDP (at just 5 percent).[14] All other indicators of military capability show that Pakistan has one 
of the  world's largest and best equipped armed forces, which of course possess a steadily 
growing arsenal of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. But statistics hardly do justice to the 
country's intense feelings of insecurity, which are rooted deeply in the past. Emerging out of 
British colonial India as a homeland for a sizeable portion of the region's Muslim population, one 
could say that Pakistan was born insecure. 
The Roots of Insecurity  
The antipathy between the Pakistan and India dates back to August 1947 when Britain partitioned 
the religiously and ethnically diverse Indian empire into two independent states. India was to 
become a secular democracy and Pakistan was intended to be a democratic homeland for South 
Asian Muslims. Because Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs lived in virtually every part of the British 
colony, more than six million Muslims migrated to Pakistan, and more than four million Hindus 
and Sikhs moved to India.[15] Communal tensions often flared into violence. More than one 
million migrants were slaughtered, and the religious minorities remaining behind often were 
treated poorly.[16] 
Bitter memories of partition remain etched in the minds of older Indians and Pakistanis, and even 
the youth hold strong views because of jingoistic accounts passed down through state-controlled 
educational texts and the media (especially the vernacular language media). Still worse, 
Pakistanis fear that India rejects the “two-nation theory” that was the logic behind partition. India’s 
active support for the creation of Bangladesh (which had been East Pakistan) in 1971 reinforced 
Pakistan’s view that New Delhi aspires to re-unify the Indian empire under its control, or at least 
reduce Pakistan to a position of weakness and subservience like India’s other neighbors (with the 
notable exception of China).[17] Because both countries are vulnerable to religious and ethnic 
fragmentation,[18] moreover, each side fears that the other will exploit its social and political 
cleavages to undermine the legitimacy of the state. 
For Pakistan, the greatest concern in this regard is in the territory bordering Afghanistan, where 
Pashtun tribesmen periodically have threatened to withdraw from the Pakistani state to form a 
greater Pashtunistan nation with their kinfolk across the border in Afghanistan. To this very day, 
the Afghan government does not recognize the Durand Line, the 1500-mile border the British 
colonial government created in 1893 to demark the northwest boundary of its Indian empire. 
Intermittent Pak-Afghan border clashes took place during the 1950s and 1960s, and they have 
reoccurred recently as Afghan and Pakistani troops deployed along the border for counter-
terrorist missions have occasionally fired on each other.[19] Pakistan does not fear outright attack 
from the much weaker Afghan military, but India’s support for Afghanistan’s claims on Pakistani 
territory have long created unrest among Pakistani military planners, who dread the prospect of a 
major two-front war. This is the larger context in which Pakistan formulates its security policies. 
The Kashmir Dispute  
The dispute that caused three of the four Indo-Pakistani wars and continues to be a major source 
of regional tension is a direct product of partition. In 1947, Hari Singh, the Hindu maharajah of the 
mainly Muslim state of Kashmir, refused to join either India or Pakistan. India wanted Kashmir to 
solidify its identify as a pluralistic democracy, but Pakistan coveted the territory to complete its 
identity as a democratic and secure homeland for the region’s Muslim population. When tribal 
militants from Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province tried to “liberate” Kashmir, Pakistan’s 
fledgling army supported them. Under pressure from the tribal invaders, on one side, and Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s new Indian government, on the other, Hari Singh acceded to India. 
Fearing that the loss of Kashmir might spur other ethnic groups inside India to press for autonomy, 
New Delhi sent its own army to crush the tribal rebellion. War then broke out between India and 
Pakistan. When it ended in stalemate in 1948, Kashmir was divided, leaving India with two-thirds 
of the territory, including the populous and picturesque Vale of Kashmir. Since then, Pakistan has 
tried various methods, from diplomacy to the direct use of force, to wrest the remainder of 
Kashmir from Indian control. For the past fifteen years, it has covertly supported a violent 
insurgency that—together with India’s heavy-handed response—has ravaged Kashmir. Pakistan 
portrays the insurgency as a freedom movement and India calls it state-sponsored terrorism. 
Each argument contains an element of truth. 
Having claimed the lives of tens of thousands of Kashmiris, and more than once bringing India 
and Pakistan to the brink of war, the Kashmir dispute has become an unstable, emotionally 
charged source of nuclear danger.[20] No matter how dangerous the threat of nuclear war has 
become, India and Pakistan are unable to agree on an effective political process to reduce 
tensions or resolve the issue. Pakistan welcomes either direct negotiations with India or third-
party mediation; but New Delhi opposes what it views as Pakistani ploys to politicize and 
internationalize the issue. Indian government officials insist on talks only with Kashmiri groups 
that reject violence and even then, only in the context of integrating them into the Indian republic. 
Concerned outsiders have proposed various schemes to bring India and Pakistan to the 
negotiating table, but so far neither side will abandon its self-serving, hard-line position. The 
threat and actual use of force remain the dominant forms of “dialogue” between India and 
Pakistan on Kashmir. 
Dangerous Military Practices  
Some observers predicted that nuclear weapons would stabilize India-Pakistan relations and 
make war less likely because any conflict now could escalate to nuclear use.[21] This logic 
caused earlier nuclear powers to act cautiously with one another; however, the opposite appears 
to hold in South Asia. India and Pakistan exhibit care in handling and even speaking about 
nuclear forces, but each side engages in risky conduct at the conventional and low-intensity 
levels of conflict, which creates pressure for escalation to full-scale war. According to New Delhi, 
the problem began with Pakistan’s support for armed insurgents supporting Kashmiri 
independence. The Indian government estimates that these insurgents have committed over 
50,000 terrorist incidents claiming 13,000 Indian lives since 1989.[22] Islamabad retorts that more 
than 60,000 Kashmiri civilians have been killed in “a reign of terror and repression” by over 
600,000 Indian troops.[23] Although each side’s claim probably is exaggerated, the advent of 
nuclear weaponry has not diminished the violence in Indian-held Kashmir or along the Kashmir 
Line of Control (LOC), where Indian and Pakistani forces routinely have traded small arms and 
artillery fire. 
In fact, all of this border skirmishing and guerilla violence creates strong pressures for 
conventional warfare. The Indian government mobilized its armed forces in December 2001 to 
compel Pakistan to withdraw its support for the Kashmir insurgency and possibly to launch an 
attack if Pakistan failed to withdraw. Although Indian officials claimed that Pakistan continued to 
support “cross-border terrorism,” Prime Minister Vajpayee ultimately decided not to initiate a war. 
However, the Indian and Pakistani armed forces continue to prepare for the possibility of conflict. 
If war starts, Pakistan’s leadership might feel compelled to ready nuclear weapons for use, and 
Indian officials might follow suit, thus creating a situation where one wrong move could trigger a 
nuclear war. 
Key Elements of Pakistan's Strategic Culture  
This essay does not undertake a comprehensive description of Pakistan's strategic culture. But 
based on this brief survey of Pakistan's strategic history and context, five general characteristics 
of the country's strategic culture can be outlined (in decreasing order of importance).[24] 
· Opposition to Indian hegemony. Pakistani political and military elites are unified in their 
opposition to Indian hegemony as a basis for a peaceful and durable regional order. The 
very notion of an independent Pakistan was premised on the right of South Asia's Muslim 
population to enjoy the benefits of national sovereignty free from the domination of the 
region's much more populous Hindu population. After gaining independence, the 
Pakistani elites have treasured their hard-won sovereignty and resisted every Indian 
effort to curtail their freedom of action. Pakistan's political and military competition with 
India therefore forms the centerpiece of its regional and international diplomacy, its 
military planning, and its arms acquisitions.[25]  
· Primacy of defense requirements. Regardless of whether the Pakistan government was 
run by civilians or the military (which has ruled for most of Pakistan's existence), defense 
has always been the country's top budgetary priority. Although Pakistan continues to 
experience intense poverty, poor infrastructure, a weak educational system, and nearly 
non-existent social services, defense expenditures run very high, ranging from 73 percent 
in 1949-1950 to around 25 percent in recent years.[26]  
· Nuclear deterrence. Pakistan has waged a determined campaign to acquire and 
modernize an operational nuclear deterrent ever since its military loss to Indian forces in 
the 1971 East Pakistan war and the creation of Bangladesh. Despite Pakistan’s 
detonation of nuclear explosive devices in May 1998 and numerous test flights of various 
missile delivery systems, the expansion, diversification, and security of its deterrent 
remain key priorities, especially as Indian military might continues to grow. Pakistan’s 
deterrence posture is predicated on a strong conventional force capability and 
demonstration of its willingness to run high risks and pay high costs to deter aggression.  
· Acceptance, but not reliance, on outside assistance. To compensate for India's vast 
advantages in manpower, wealth, and military equipment, Pakistan consistently has 
sought out foreign supplies of modern weapons and military training. The United States 
was its main arms provider during the 1950s and 1960s and again in the 1980s,[27] but 
Islamabad turned to China and other weapons sources in the 1970s and again in the 
1990s when Washington imposed conditions on arms transfers that would inhibit 
Pakistan from pursuing nuclear weapons, which Pakistani defense planners deemed 
essential for their competition with India.  
· Identification with conservative Islamic causes. The emphasis on Muslim nationalism that 
brought Pakistan into being continues to play an important role in shaping its national 
identity and foreign relations. In the years following independence, Muslim nationalism 
became more than a nationalist ideology, it became a rallying cry for Islamic solidarity 
and Muslim causes all over the world. At times, Pakistan has tried to be seen as a leader 
of the Islamic world, but these efforts have upset some countries, which saw themselves 
as more fitting international leaders or which did not place as much emphasis on Islam as 
a domestic or international political force. Thus while Islam remains a major part of 
Pakistan’s political identity, it generally is not a dominant theme in Pakistan’s foreign and 
defense policies.  
Strategic Myths, Myth Makers, and Myth Making 
Before testing the neo-realist and strategic culture approaches against Pakistan's actual strategic 
conduct, a third approach must be introduced, one which I believe has potentially more 
explanatory power over many national security questions. My approach emphasizes the strategic 
beliefs and political behavior of strategic myth makers . The argument is that a country is likely to 
adopt a certain national security strategy (such as developing nuclear weapons, or allying with 
another country) when certain national elites who want their government to adopt this strategy, (1) 
emphasize their country’s insecurity or its poor international standing, (2) portray this strategy as 
the best corrective for these problems, (3) successfully associate these beliefs with existing 
cultural norms and political priorities, and finally (4) convince policy makers to accept and act on 
these views. 
This argument provides insight into the sources of key national security debates as well: if 
enterprising and well-connected strategic elites manage to cultivate a national—or at least a 
governmental—consensus around the notion that not pursuing the strategy in question (for 
example, not developing nuclear weapons, or not aligning with a certain foreign power) would 
make the country less secure or less influential, then the government is not likely to initiate or 
continue this course of action. At any given time and in any given country, of course, various 
strategic myths will co-exist and compete with rival strategic myths. 
The success of one myth over another depends on three factors:  
1. the substantive content of the strategic myth and its compatibility with existing cultural 
norms and political priorities;  
2. the ability of the myth maker to legitimize and popularize his or her beliefs among fellow 
elites and then to persuade national leaders to act on these beliefs; and finally  
3. the process whereby institutional actors integrate the popularized strategic myths into 
their own organizational identities and missions.  
Theoretical Assumptions  
The emphasis on strategic myth making is not intended to downplay the significance of actual 
security threats or real status considerations as powerful inducements for countries to seek 
certain defense policies. On the contrary, it is hard to imagine any responsible government official 
calling for a significant national security strategy (such as acquiring nuclear weapons) without a 
prior interest in solving some pressing military or political problem. Realists are correct: the real 
world does matter. Strategic myths and the existence of genuine security threats are closely 
correlated. 
The chief distinction between the myth-maker approach and the neo-realist or strategic cultural 
perspectives described above lies at the level of analysis. Whereas security and cultural accounts 
focus on the prior events or conditions that are believed to trigger a certain strategic behavior, I 
emphasize the arguments and the political maneuvering that link the triggering conditions to the 
subsequent decision to adopt this policy and then to the actual process of implementing this 
policy. Three elements are singled out in my approach:  
1. the composition, scope, and logical consistency of the strategic myths themselves,  
2. the identity, background and skills of the strategic myth maker, or carrier of these beliefs; 
and  
3. the process of strategic myth making—of legitimizing, popularizing and institutionalizing 
strategic arguments about national security policy.  
This argument rests on two assertions that are not necessarily rejected by neo-realists, but which 
certainly are not emphasized by them either. The first assumption is that the beliefs of individuals 
matter for foreign policy making and international behavior.[28] Analysis of foreign policy decision 
making is not required to understand all security problems, but choices and strategies about 
certain very important policies, such as acquiring nuclear weapons, are not adequately explained 
without reference to the beliefs of decision makers concerning the political and military 
implications of these policies. This is true because of the multiple and only partially predictable 
political, economic and military consequences of developing, deploying, threatening to use, or 
actually using nuclear weapons. Second, talented and well-placed experts can play a crucial part 
in helping to create, diffuse and perpetuate strategic myths. 
Types of Strategic Myths  
The argument developed above posits that the behavior of various states is influenced by the 
beliefs that officials in these states hold about national security affairs. To illustrate what kinds of 
beliefs matter the most, consider the case of nuclear weapons development. Two kinds of beliefs 
play especially important roles in the development of nuclear weapons. The first beliefs are the 
myths of nuclear security and nuclear influence. These are beliefs about the desirability of 
acquiring nuclear weapons. The other set of beliefs concerns the technical, economic, and 
political feasibility of building nuclear bombs as well as the utility of eventually using these 
weapons for military purposes. Table 1 lists these sets of beliefs and summarizes their main 
characteristics. 
Table 1: Categories of Beliefs about Nuclear Weapons  
Belief Type  Subject of Belief  
Nuclear Myths   
Nuclear 
security 
Relationship between nuclear weapons acquisition and the political 
and military dimensions of national security  
Nuclear 
influence  
Relationship between nuclear weapons acquisition and the status 






Capacity to overcome technical difficulties associated with 
developing nuclear weapons; possibility for industrial spin-offs.  
Economic 
feasibility 
Capacity to meet financial costs associated with developing nuclear 
weapons; possibility for lucrative industrial spin-offs.  
Political 
feasibility  
Capacity to mange political problems associated with developing 
nuclear weapons; impact on relations with important states.  
Military utility  
Capacity to develop operational nuclear weapons and to devise 
options for their effective use in military operations.  
The key variables in the strategic myth-making approach, as described above, are summarized in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Categories of Strategic Beliefs  
 
Pakistan's Security Policy Analyzed 
Having described the essential features of three analytical approaches that can be employed to 
account for Pakistan's security policy, the task now is to specify predictions from these three 
separate theoretical approaches and then evaluate these predictions against the historical data 
on specific Pakistani security policies. I choose two especially pertinent Pakistani policies for very 
brief, illustrative analysis:  
1. Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons; and  
2. Pakistan's post 9-11 decision to reverse its support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan 
and more generally support the United States in the global war on terrorism.  
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program  
Arguably, the most important—and controversial—strategic choice Pakistan made in its five-plus 
decades of existence was to develop nuclear weapons. It managed to obtain nuclear weapons 
and maintain a close relationship with the United States, the stalwart if the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. Looking at the issue of whether Pakistan should have developed nuclear 
weapons, and when, the three theoretical perspectives developed in this essay lead to very 
different predictions: 
· Neo-realism: According to the neo-realist model, which posits that countries generally try 
to balance against security threats first by developing their own military might and only 
secondly by forming alliances, Pakistan should have launched a crash program to 
develop nuclear weapons when it learned that its archrival, India, had initiated its own 
program to make nuclear bombs shortly after China's nuclear test in October 1964. 
Although many Pakistani officials suspected India of harboring an interest in nuclear 
weapons soon after independence, when Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru openly 
mused about the benefits of nuclear power, Pakistan became convinced about India's 
nuclear program when the latter launched its Subterranean Nuclear Experiment Project 
(SNEP) in early 1965.  
· Strategic culture: Focusing more on the internal and historical attributes of Pakistan, this 
approach would hypothesize that because the dominant national security organization in 
the country was the armed forces, and because this institution was very conservative and 
pro-Western, Pakistan would continue to rely on conventional weapons and a close 
strategic relationship with the United States to meet its security needs.  
· Myth making: This approach would expect Pakistan to pursue the nuclear option when 
key national elites were able to convince the country's leadership that nuclear weapons 
production is required to enhance the state's security, power, and welfare.  
The historical record supports each one of these approaches to some extent, but on the whole, 
the myth making model performs better. As realists would expect, a strong pro-bomb lobby 
formed in Pakistan in 1964 and 1965. Led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who served as foreign minister 
under President Ayub Khan's military regime in the mid-1960s, this group urged Ayub to match 
India's nuclear progress by approving Pakistan's own secret nuclear weapons research and 
development program, but Ayub resisted their pressure and ruled against going nuclear,[29] just 
as strategic culture proponents would expect. 
After Pakistan's devastating loss to India in the December 1971 Bangladesh war, however, the 
Pakistan government finally initiated a nuclear bomb program. This time, realists would predict 
this decision and strategic culturalists would not. But the key factor was once again the role of 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who had emerged as the country's president following the Bangladesh defeat. 
Now at the helm, Bhutto instructed his top scientists to begin work at once on nuclear weapons. 
Pakistan's nuclear policymaking is best understood through the lens of the myth maker approach, 
which can explain how the myth of nuclear security initially spread in the 1960s, why it failed to 
shape official policy at that time, and why Pakistan ultimately decided to go nuclear in 1972. The 
key factors in this analysis are Bhutto's critical role as Pakistan's primary nuclear myth maker, the 
gradual acceptance of the strategic beliefs that nuclear weapons would enhance Pakistan's 
security and influence, and the eventual institutionalization of these beliefs among Pakistan's 
politicians, the armed forces, and the bureaucracy—to the extent that no leader after Bhutto could 
(or would want to) reverse Pakistan's nuclear weapons policy. 
Pakistan's Post-9/11 Policy Reversal  
Al Qaeda’s September 11, 2001 attacks against Washington, D.C. and New York city 
fundamentally altered Pakistan’s relations with the United States. The George W. Bush 
administration’s campaign to destroy the Taliban as a haven for terrorist networks with global 
reach and to eliminate the Al Qaeda network had a particularly dramatic impact on Pakistan, 
which had been the Taliban’s strongest ally. Pakistan had helped the Taliban consolidate power 
in Afghanistan in the mid-to-late 1990s. Viewing the Taliban as a friendly if fanatical regime that 
could stabilize Pakistan’s often unruly Pushtun population and also provide much-needed 
“strategic depth” in Pakistan’s military competition with India, Pakistani leaders were loathe to see 
the return of instability, and possibly hostility, on their western flank. But faced with intense 
pressure from the United States, President Pervez Musharraf agreed to break relations with the 
Taliban, provide basing and over-flight permission for all U.S. and coalition forces, deploy two 
divisions of troops along the Afghanistan border in support of OEF, and provide intelligence 
support to the international anti-terrorism coalition.[30] When he announced this controversial 
policy reversal on Afghanistan in a September 2001 speech to the nation, President Musharraf 
indicated that any other decision could have caused “unbearable losses” to the security of the 
country, the health of the economy, the Kashmir cause, and to Pakistan’s strategic nuclear and 
missile assets.[31] 
While most of Pakistan’s mainstream political parties supported the government’s decision to join 
the international coalition against terrorism, the country’s Islamic groups and parties were 
outraged. About two dozen religious parties, including the powerful Jamaat-e-Islami, which earlier 
had cooperated with the Musharraf government, came together under the umbrella of the Pak-
Afghan Defense Council and launched a nationwide campaign to oust Musharraf. Strikes and 
street demonstrations occurred throughout the country, American flags were burned, several 
people were killed, and many buildings were destroyed. Truckloads of Pakistani extremists also 
traveled to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban against the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition. 
However, none of these actions managed to incite the Pakistani population against the 
government or persuade President Musharraf either to backtrack on his policies or to step down. 
What would our three theoretical perspectives have to say about Pakistan's post-9/11 policy 
reversal on Afghanistan? 
· Neo-realism: According to the neo-realist model, Pakistan would do whatever was 
required to balance against its key adversary, India. President Musharraf warned in his 
famous September 19, 2001 address to the nation: “Lets look at our neighbors. They 
have promised U.S. all cooperation. They want to isolate us, get us declared a terrorist 
state.”[32] Because continuing support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan would mean 
opposing the United States, and driving Washington into a military alliance with India, 
realpolitik dictated that Pakistan join the U.S. counter-Taliban coalition.  
· Strategic culture: Giving more causal weight to the beliefs and desires of powerful 
domestic constituencies, such as the pro-Taliban Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate 
(ISID), the strategic cultural argument probably would expect Pakistan to find a way to 
maintain its strong support for its Taliban allies in Afghanistan.  
· Myth making: This approach would argue that Pakistan's policy decision would depend 
mainly on the strategic beliefs of the country's leader, President Pervez Musharraf. It 
would recognize that Musharraf faced internal pressures to stand by the Taliban and 
external pressures to support the United States; but his own beliefs and his ability to 
cultivate support fro these beliefs among the country's influential elites (principally among 
the armed forces) would be the key factor. Because Musharraf’s own strategic beliefs, at 
least in this case, corresponded with the tents of realpolitik, this particular security policy 
is overdetermined: both the neo-realist and the strategic myth-maker approaches would 
successfully predict Pakistan's behavior.  
The sudden shift in Pakistan's Afghanistan policy poses a potentially big problem for strategic 
cultural analysis. For that matter, all cultural studies, which point to the steady socialization of 
values and beliefs over time, have difficulty in explaining change. But some proponents of 
strategic culture recognize that under certain conditions strategic cultures do change. Jeffrey 
Lantis observes that two conditions, in particular, cause strategic cultures to transform. First, 
external shocks can fundamentally challenge existing beliefs and undermine long-held historical 
narratives and practices.[33] The second cause of change is related to the first. At certain times, 
deeply held foreign policy commitments clash and force policymakers to make critical choices. In 
the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan suffered a serious external shock and President 
Musharraf was forced to choose between the Taliban and the United States. This choice posed 
intense value tradeoffs and arguably caused Musharraf—and Pakistan’s strategic culture—to 
adapt to new circumstances, much as realism and the myth-making approaches would have 
suggested. The myth-making model is particularly useful in accounting for this policy shift, 
because it sees leaders (and other strategic elites) as instrumental in defining—and redefining—
policy goals. They can preserve traditions or they can choose to move beyond previous 
boundaries of acceptability. Musharraf clearly did the latter. 
Implications 
This short essay explores the relative utility of three theoretical approaches in accounting for 
specific Pakistani foreign policy choices. Neo-realism and a general model of strategic cultural 
analysis each point to significant constraints on the freedom of choice of Pakistani leaders. Neo-
realists correctly comprehend that the imperatives of international competition, and especially 
Pakistan’s long-standing political and military rivalry with India, have severely restricted the room 
for maneuver of successive Pakistani heads of states. Similarly, proponents of strategic cultural 
analysis can show how the values and beliefs of the Pakistani population, and especially the 
conservative armed forces and the bureaucracy, also have constrained Pakistani policies over 
time. 
As Pakistan’s policymaking on nuclear weapons illustrates, at one time (the mid-1960s) the 
Pakistani leadership defied the dictates of Realpolitik and instead acted according to the 
traditional strategic views of the armed forces (as strategic culture would predict), which was not 
to go nuclear, but to maintain close security ties with the United States and to beef up its 
conventional military forces. But at another time (1972), Pakistan’s leadership reversed course 
and chose to manufacture nuclear weapons, even if this policy resulted in the estrangement of 
relations with Washington (which it did, during the 1990s). Why do some Realpolitik or cultural 
constraints seem so severe at one time and yet so malleable at other times? 
The answer lies with the behavior of strategic key strategic elites, who are free to accept some 
constraints and yet ignore or overcome others. These elites, whom I call strategic myth makers , 
operate within the confines of both the international environment and their nation's political culture, 
but they sometimes have some degree of freedom to reorient and expand the internal and 
external boundaries of their behavior. However, the more a myth maker tries to extend either of 
these boundaries of traditional behavior, the greater the risk he runs domestically and 
internationally. 
Leadership entails knowing one's limits, but also knowing how to take advantage of rare 
opportunities for change, when they present themselves. The myth-making approach points 
analysts to examine strategic elites as well as their beliefs about national security. It further calls 
attention to the institutionalization of these beliefs, or myths, in the rules, values, and beliefs of 
key national security institutions. As organization theorists would understand, the more national 
security myths become institutionalized, the greater the hold of culture takes over strategic elites. 
If U.S. policymakers had recognized this, they would have understood why their efforts to 
discourage Pakistan from going nuclear were doomed to fail from the mid-1970s onward. 
Similarly, if current American officials understand Pakistan's strategic culture, and the role of key 
individuals and elites within the country's key strategic institutions, they would have a much better 
handle on the question of how reliable an ally Pakistan will be now and in the future. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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